By Colonel Paurush Pradhan (Retd) · 10 March 2026

The latest conflicts underscore a fundamental truth: winning wars requires weapon systems designed for prosecuting war, not merely for sustaining defence industries.

Recent events highlight an emerging asymmetry. On one side, relatively low-cost systems—missiles, drones and projectiles—have demonstrated the ability to impose disproportionate strategic and economic costs. On the other hand, technologically superior adversaries are compelled to expend far greater resources in interception, replenishment and escalation.

For the United States, this dynamic translates into a paradoxical advantage. The expenditure of munitions feeds directly back into its defence-industrial ecosystem. Losses on the battlefield are offset by gains in research, development and production cycles. In effect, conflict sustains the machinery of profit.

The Soviet Union’s T-34 tank was not the most sophisticated machine of its time, but it was reliable, scalable and produced in overwhelming numbers—a decisive factor in a war of survival. Similarly, contemporary examples such as Iran’s Shahed drones reflect a doctrine centred on affordability, mass production and operational sufficiency rather than technological perfection.

Wars of survival demand a different calculus. They require “munitions for war”—systems that are:

For many nations, particularly those without the industrial depth or financial elasticity of the United States, the pursuit of high-end, high-cost systems alone may prove strategically limiting. The central question, therefore, is not merely what weapons to build, but what kind of war a nation is preparing to fight.

The next war of India may not be won by the most advanced systems, but by those that can be produced, sustained and deployed at scale under conditions of prolonged attrition.

In the final analysis, the balance between “munitions of profit” and “munitions for war” may well determine not just the outcome of conflicts, but the resilience of nations themselves.